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The Lone Assassin Page 5
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TIMES: “In the effort to annihilate the Nazis, some moral values will naturally get lost. Nonetheless, millions are praying that Nazism will be destroyed.”
Vladimir D’Ormesson in FIGARO: “France and England must reduce Germany to rubble. We must obliterate the Hitlerite instigators of European wars.”
PETIT PARISIEN: “Hitler is faced with a decision: either to depart of his own free will or to be plunged into the abyss.”
CHAMBERLAIN: “Peace is not possible as long as Hitlerism continues to exist. We must put an end to it.”
DAILY MAIL, twenty-four hours before the attack: “The discussion of war objectives is simply senseless. All that remains for us to do now is to eliminate Hitler.”
And as if to resolve any remaining doubts about the participation of British agents, this compilation was followed by the note:
The whole world noticed that the British newspapers were able to report strangely quickly on the attack in Munich. Thus the DAILY EXPRESS could already give a detailed report on the night of November 9, while foreign newspapers that have correspondents in Germany did not yet have any news.
There was no doubt that these propaganda messages would be taken up in media reports and commentaries, for a critical, oppositional press had not existed for a long time. The Nazi policy known as Gleichschaltung—enforced coordination and uniformity, achieved in part through the suppression of politically dissident organizations, especially among the working class and the Jewish minority—had silenced the opposition, driving them into prisons and concentration camps, into emigration or underground activity.
But the Munich attack did not lend itself only to warmongering. As the Nazi propagandists recognized immediately, the myth of providence—the myth of the inviolability and invincibility of the Führer—could also be nourished. The fact that they achieved both goals is illustrated by secret briefings from that time. On November 10, the SD officers on Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin noted:
In many schools, the chorale “Now thank we all our God” was sung. Various factory leaders informed their followers of the attack at roll calls. The public was especially unsettled in the course of yesterday morning, before the particulars of the attack became known. Rumors cropped up everywhere—such as reports that the Führer had been seriously injured and that various leaders of the party and of the state had been killed. As the details of the assassination attempt became known in the course of the day, all the resulting problems were widely discussed. The British and Jews, who are widely regarded as being behind the attack, were discussed with acrimony. In some places, there were demonstrations against Jews. Generally, it is hoped that from now on the Führer will no longer expose himself to such dangers, as he has done often recently.
Furthermore, people are now expecting various retaliatory measures against all enemies of the state and a sudden outward attack on Great Britain.
The German Intelligence Service reported that same day on public loyalty demonstrations in the Reich:
Kassel, November 10—After the nefarious crime in Munich, which has provoked extreme outrage and profound horror in all strata of the German public, over 100,000 comrades gathered in the afternoon hours on Thursday on Friedrichsplatz in Kassel to express their gratitude for the kind providence that saved our Führer and to offer Adolf Hitler a spontaneous loyalty oath of their steadfast allegiance.
On November 13, 1939, another secret report on the internal political situation read:
The Munich attack has bolstered the sense of solidarity in the German people.
The interest of the public in the results of the special commission assigned to investigate the attack is enormous. The question of how this attack could happen is still the main topic of conversation in all circles. The love for the Führer has grown even stronger, and the attitude toward the war has become even more positive in many circles as a result of the attack.
There is a pronounced mood of hate toward Great Britain. The fact that the Führer was present during the funeral services in Munich impressed the general public deeply. The participation of Munich residents in the state funeral for the victims of the attack was relatively low. Only on Odeonsplatz did a crowd of onlookers form, though without showing an especially deep interest in the solemn act.
It was not only the rather passive attitude of the Munich public that was regarded with suspicion. The reactions of the churches were criticized, as well:
It is uniformly reported from the whole territory of the Reich that there have been strikingly distinct reactions to the Munich attack on the part of the Catholic Church on the one hand, and the Protestant Church on the other. In all parts of the Reich, the Catholic clergy avoids taking any position on the event, disregards it as if it had not occurred.
Approvingly, however, the report notes:
In contrast, the Protestant Church has sharply condemned the Munich attack and taken a clear position. In some parts of the Reich, services of thanksgiving for the Führer’s survival were held, and in others there were pulpit declarations, which, to single out an example from Stuttgart, had roughly the following wording:
“Distress over the diabolical attempted attack on the life of our Führer still trembles in all of us who have come together today, but the gratitude for God’s saving mercy is also great and powerful in us.
“In the rain of bullets of the world war, during the courageous march on November 9, 1923, in the ensuing years of struggle for political power, and now during the diabolical attack, the almighty God has always held His protective hand over him, and we will pray to God each morning to preserve our Führer, give him—and us with him—victory, so that we come to a good peace and our people are granted space to live [lebensraum] and the possibility to live.”
One people, one Reich, one Führer—perfectly in tune with the Nazi propagandists. Up to that point, the attack had lent itself ideally to their objectives. But what about that illegal border crosser who had been brought to Munich and was sitting in a Gestapo cell awaiting his next interrogation?
In his interrogations with SS officer Nebe, Elser had so far denied the act and generally said as little as possible. Meanwhile, the evidence against him had been steadily accumulating. Employees of the Bürgerbräu Beer Hall who had been questioned remembered him. A businessman who was tracked down—the supplier of the insulation material that was buried in the rubble—also remembered the small man with the Swabian accent. In the meantime, the crime scene commission had pinpointed the origin of the explosion in a column close to the floor of the gallery. The perpetrator must have worked on his knees and presumably did so for nights on end. On his own? Hard to believe. Nebe was certain that there were co-conspirators. But Elser wasn’t saying anything. He didn’t name names or provide any information at all. Yes, he had occasionally sat in the Bürgerbräu Beer Hall, he had answered when Nebe confronted him with the statements of the staff, but that was permitted—it was a public establishment, after all.
Himmler was losing patience. If Nebe couldn’t manage it, someone else would have to conduct the interrogations. On November 13, Kriminalrat and SS-Obersturmbannführer Huber took over as head of the commission. They had a conspiracy theory. Now all they needed was a perpetrator.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Confession
There was a knock at the door. As two Gestapo officers led Elser inside, he struck Kriminalrat Huber as small and slight. Huber scrutinized Elser, whose alert, lively eyes lent his face a cunning quality.
No, thought Huber, it’s impossible—this man cannot have had anything to do with the attack. On the other hand, he knew that Elser was a member of the Red Front Fighters League, a group with close ties to the Communist Party, and he also knew about the incriminating objects that had been found on him. In Huber’s view, the matter should be approached more from the angle of the motive. The man in front of him, who had now been interrogated for days, seemed to have a sensitive nature. Huber thought he had discovered a strong sense of justice in him. A
t least, his previous statements could convey that impression.
In preparation, Huber had read the transcripts of all the interrogations that had been performed up to that point. Perhaps this seemingly good-natured Elser had been persuaded to carry out the assassination by the ringleaders of the attack? He certainly had the necessary practical abilities, for he was a craftsman.
Huber wanted to proceed strategically on that afternoon of November 13, confronting Elser with his contradictory statements and relentlessly questioning him in those areas where he had so far hidden behind vague answers. At the same time, he wanted to appeal to his sense of moral values, provide him possible “honorable” motives, thereby building him a bridge to confession. Carrot and stick—the time-tested method.
But Huber didn’t get anywhere that day, either. Whenever he thought a question would make things difficult for Elser, the man fell silent or evaded him—particularly when he addressed his stay in Munich.
“So what were you living on here?” Huber asked. “You had no work at all.”
Elser was silent for a long time. Finally, he said, “I had my savings. I looked for work. But it had to be right. Not just the pay …”
Huber had gotten used to answers like this. The man had nerves of steel. In a calm tone he stated his answers, and sometimes they even sounded plausible. But it was clear to Huber that the evidence argued against Elser’s seemingly believable accounts.
All the details had long since been investigated. Among others, his former landlords had been questioned. Though Elser had told them he was looking for work, he could not name a single workshop where he had introduced himself during his stay in Munich. He had always rented properly with his real name and done nothing to make his landlords unhappy. On the contrary, they described him as a quiet tenant—a loner, yes, but helpful and friendly.
Frau Luchmann, with whom Elser had lived for a few weeks, remembered her calm, though occasionally somewhat odd-seeming, tenant.
He had a few heavy boxes with him. My husband helped him carry them to the cellar. Upstairs he kept only a wooden trunk, but it didn’t fit into the small room, so we put it in the hallway. Herr Elser actually was a bit strange, but I didn’t really notice that at the time. Only once did I open the door to his floor unannounced. He was crouching in front of his trunk and flipping through a folder of drawings. When he saw me, he threw everything back into the trunk and locked it.
And there was something else about her tenant that had struck Frau Luchmann: He always came home very late at night, and sometimes he didn’t come home at all. I noticed that when I went to bring him his breakfast. I was surprised, because he wasn’t that type.
Others who had provided him accommodations were equally in the dark about what the quiet tenant did with his time. As long as he had not found a job, he was working on an invention, Elser told another landlady. Was this invention the “infernal machine” used later for the bomb attack?
Huber had visited the crime scene. The bomb had been built into the column on the gallery in front of which the Führer had spoken. Precise detective work had also yielded the conclusion that the explosive device had been positioned close to the floor—but that required prolonged work that could only have been done on the knees. At that moment, Huber remembered his reflections after the crime scene inspection. He stood up from his chair, walked around the large desk and instructed Elser to take off his pants. “Here, now … at once!”
Elser hesitated for a moment, seemingly embarrassed. “It’s just about the knees,” said Huber, planting himself in front of him.
Slowly Elser pulled up his pants legs, inch by inch … Huber saw immediately that his knees were swollen and inflamed. “Do you have something to say to me now?” he asked, breaking the silence.
Elser did not speak for a long time. Then, so softly that he could scarcely be heard, he asked, “If someone did something like that, what should he expect?”
Huber was surprised for a moment. Was that a confession? He answered, “That depends why he did it.”
At that point, when the confession seemed to be mere minutes away, anyone else would have continued the interrogation, but Huber broke it off. “We’ll see each other again later,” he called to Elser without further explanation, as two officers escorted him to his cell. Huber was certain that he had proven Elser’s guilt. The confession—the successful conclusion of his work—he wanted to stage dramatically that evening in the presence of the other leaders of the Bürgerbräu Attack Special Commission, Nebe and Lobbes.
Shortly before midnight, he had Elser brought to him again. Officers led him to a chair in front of the desk; behind it sat Huber. No one said a word, including Nebe and Lobbes, who were impatiently pacing, waiting for the confession. Elser seemed downcast and even smaller than usual. He kept drinking from the bottle of mineral water in front of him.
He looked around timidly. Then, without any prompting, he blurted it out: “Yes, I did it.”
The Gestapo men looked at each other with relief. Elser reached for the bottle and filled his glass. He then recounted in detail how he had planned and built the bomb and planted it in the column. It was almost four o’clock in the morning when the transcriber wrote down Elser’s last sentences. Afterward, he was brought back to his cell.
More often than on the previous nights, Gestapo guards observed him through the peephole. A dead assassin was of no use to anyone—least of all to the Nazi leadership.
* * *
In the interrogation room of the Wittelsbach Palace, Huber, Nebe, and Lobbes were at once relieved and pensive. The confession had triggered an avalanche of follow-up questions. How was it possible that a man could work undisturbed for nights on end on the gallery of the Bürgerbräu Beer Hall? Had there been no security measures before November 8?
According to Directive No. 34/36 of the Führer’s deputy from March 9, 1936, the SS-Reichsführer or a senior SS officer appointed by him was solely responsible for all barriers and security measures at events in which Hitler participated. But here in Munich, the “old fighters” presided over a territory the SS and police could not infiltrate.
In November 1936, there had been a dispute between the Munich party leader Christian Weber and the city’s chief of police Baron von Eberstein over the question of who was responsible for security at the event. At that time, Hitler had announced his decision: “At this gathering, my ‘old fighters’ will guard me under the leadership of Christian Weber. The responsibility of the police ends at the entrances to the hall.” It had been handled the same way this time.
Inquiries had revealed that Josef Gerum, an old marcher and party member since 1920 who was a senior Gestapo officer in Munich, had assumed responsibility for security. In the summer of 1939, he had volunteered for army service and participated in the Polish campaign in a unit of the Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police). As he happened to be in Munich due to illness, he had been assigned on November 8 to take over security in the Bürgerbräu during Hitler’s speech. The security measures had been cursory, confined to the patrolling of the hall. On the day of the event, security at the entrances was intensified and the participants observed. What could happen here among the old comrades-in-arms? After the attack, as Huber, Nebe, and Lobbes knew, the party leadership had been infuriated. All the blame was focused on Christian Weber, who now had to answer for the fact that he had entrusted a man like Gerum with such an important task.
On grounds of an alleged “danger of suppression of evidence,” party comrade Gerum was even taken into custody for a short time. This made him extremely angry, and he threatened to complain to the Führer himself about this outrageous treatment. But the Gestapo investigators probably regarded it as possible that Gerum (who would later turn up in a note in Himmler’s files as a malcontent and endlessly critical “old fighter type”) was in cahoots with the assassins. In the meantime, Gerum had been released. They had a perpetrator. But who were the masterminds, the Gestapo men in the Wittelsbach Palace wo
ndered. Who were the actual “string pullers”?
* * *
On the morning of November 14, Huber called his superior in Berlin, the chief of the Gestapo, SS-Oberführer Heinrich Müller. He was pleased to hear the news that Georg Elser had confessed. But at the end of the conversation, he asked the decisive question: “And who is behind it?”
Huber answered with consternation: “No one.”
Annoyed, Müller shouted into the telephone: “Tell that to Himmler!”
The situation was awkward. Himmler had no use for a German craftsman who had raised his hand against the Führer of his own accord. He needed foreign manipulators, string pullers, a conspiracy of “world Jewry,” the British, or Strasser. But Huber could not help with that.
In Berlin, there was great annoyance about the results of the Munich special commission—especially from Himmler. When he first set eyes on the interrogation transcripts from Munich, he wrote on them in his angular handwriting, What idiot performed the interrogation? The responsible men of the Bürgerbräu Attack Special Commission thus could not expect praise from Berlin; on the contrary, Himmler ordered a new investigation, this time under the exclusive control of the Gestapo. “Bring the perpetrator to Berlin,” he commanded.
On the afternoon of November 14, Georg Elser was fetched from his cell. He looked tired; the nights of interrogations had worn him out. Almost drowsily, he asked, “What’s going on? Am I going to be questioned again?”
A Gestapo officer laughed in his face. “My friend, now you’re going to Berlin. There’s a different climate there. You can talk more there.”
Early that evening, Elser was transported to Berlin under heavy guard.
Not until seven days later, on November 21, did the German News Agency disseminate a “special report” on Elser’s arrest.